Abstract
We study a two-stage deterministic differentiated-product oligopoly competition game, called the quantity precommitment game, in which firms compete on quantity in the first stage and then compete on price in the second stage. We compare this game with a single-stage Cournot game, in which firms compete on quantity only and prices are set to clear the market. We show that any equilibrium of the quantity precommitment game is an equilibrium of the Cournot game under certain conditions that allow for commonly used demand functions and general spill models. Our approach yields insight into key properties that enable this relationship to hold.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 109-122 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Operations Research |
Volume | 67 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2019 |
Keywords
- Competition
- Differentiated products
- Pricing
- Quantity and capacity decisions
- Spill effects
- Substitution
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Management Science and Operations Research