Abstract
We study ways to restrict or prevent the damage that can be caused in a peer-to-peer network by corrupt entities creating multiple pseudonyms. We show that it is possible to remotely issue certificates that can be used to test the distinctness of identities. To our knowledge, this is the first work that shows that remote anonymous certification of identity is possible under adversarial conditions. Our certification protocols are based on geometric techniques that establish location information in a fault-tolerant and distributed fashion. They do not rely on a centralized certifying authority or infrastructure that has direct knowledge of entities in the system, and work in Euclidean or spherical geometry of arbitrary dimension. Our protocols tolerate corrupt entities, including corrupt certifiers as well as collusion by certification applicants and certifiers. We consider both broadcast and point-to-point message passing models.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing |
Pages | 312-320 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Volume | 24 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2005 |
Event | 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2005 - Las Vegas, NV, United States Duration: Jul 17 2005 → Jul 20 2005 |
Other
Other | 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2005 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Las Vegas, NV |
Period | 7/17/05 → 7/20/05 |
Keywords
- Distance geometry
- Fault-tolerance
- Identity verification
- Overlay networks
- Peer-to-peer systems
- Security
- Sybil attack
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Hardware and Architecture