On the establishment of distinct identifies in overlay networks

Rida Bazzi, Goran Konjevod

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study ways to restrict or prevent the damage that can be caused in a peer-to-peer network by corrupt entities creating multiple pseudonyms. We show that it is possible to remotely issue certificates that can be used to test the distinctness of identities. To our knowledge, this is the first work that shows that remote anonymous certification of identity is possible under adversarial conditions. Our certification protocols are based on geometric techniques that establish location information in a fault-tolerant and distributed fashion. They do not rely on a centralized certifying authority or infrastructure that has direct knowledge of entities in the system, and work in Euclidean or spherical geometry of arbitrary dimension. Our protocols tolerate corrupt entities, including corrupt certifiers as well as collusion by certification applicants and certifiers. We consider both broadcast and point-to-point message passing models.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
Pages312-320
Number of pages9
Volume24
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005
Event24th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2005 - Las Vegas, NV, United States
Duration: Jul 17 2005Jul 20 2005

Other

Other24th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2005
CountryUnited States
CityLas Vegas, NV
Period7/17/057/20/05

Fingerprint

Overlay networks
Network protocols
Peer to peer networks
Message passing
Geometry

Keywords

  • Distance geometry
  • Fault-tolerance
  • Identity verification
  • Overlay networks
  • Peer-to-peer systems
  • Security
  • Sybil attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture

Cite this

Bazzi, R., & Konjevod, G. (2005). On the establishment of distinct identifies in overlay networks. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (Vol. 24, pp. 312-320) https://doi.org/10.1145/1073814.1073873

On the establishment of distinct identifies in overlay networks. / Bazzi, Rida; Konjevod, Goran.

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. Vol. 24 2005. p. 312-320.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Bazzi, R & Konjevod, G 2005, On the establishment of distinct identifies in overlay networks. in Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. vol. 24, pp. 312-320, 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2005, Las Vegas, NV, United States, 7/17/05. https://doi.org/10.1145/1073814.1073873
Bazzi R, Konjevod G. On the establishment of distinct identifies in overlay networks. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. Vol. 24. 2005. p. 312-320 https://doi.org/10.1145/1073814.1073873
Bazzi, Rida ; Konjevod, Goran. / On the establishment of distinct identifies in overlay networks. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. Vol. 24 2005. pp. 312-320
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