Network ties among low-tax firms

Jennifer Brown, Katharine D. Drake

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines (1) whether network ties help explain variation in tax avoidance, and (2) how the relation between network ties and tax avoidance varies depending on the nature and context of those ties. We posit that information on a range of tax-avoidance strategies is shared among firms through their social network connections. Using board interlocks to proxy for these connections, we find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms have lower cash ETRs themselves. Ties to low-tax firms are more influential when the focal firm and its network partner are operationally and strategically similar, as are ties created by executive directors. Board ties to low-tax firms are also more influential when the focal firm and its network partner engage the same local auditor. Overall, our results suggest that the influence of firms' network ties on their tax-avoidance behavior depends on the character of those ties.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)483-510
Number of pages28
JournalAccounting Review
Volume89
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

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Tax
Tax avoidance
Social networks
Cash
Interlock
Auditors

Keywords

  • Corporate tax avoidance
  • Director interlocks
  • Social networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Network ties among low-tax firms. / Brown, Jennifer; Drake, Katharine D.

In: Accounting Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2014, p. 483-510.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Brown, Jennifer ; Drake, Katharine D. / Network ties among low-tax firms. In: Accounting Review. 2014 ; Vol. 89, No. 2. pp. 483-510.
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