Moral judgment and causal attributions: Consequences of engaging in earnings management

Steven Kaplan, James C. McElroy, Susan P. Ravenscroft, Charles B. Shrader

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent, well-publicized accounting scandals have shown that the penalties outsiders impose on those found culpable of earnings management can be severe. However, less is known about how colleagues within internal labor markets respond when they believe fellow managers have managed earnings. Designers of responsibility accounting systems need to understand the reputational costs managers impose on one another within internal labor markets. In an experimental study, 159 evening MBA students were asked to assume the role of a manager in a company and respond to a scenario in which another manager (the target manager) has the opportunity to engage in earnings management. Participants provided causal attributions, assessed the morality of the target manager, and indicated whether they would change their judgments about the target manager's reputation. The study manipulated three between-subjects factors: (1) whether the target manager chose to engage in earnings management, (2) whether the company's budgetary control system was rigid or flexible, and (3) whether the target manager's work history was average or above average. We found that causal attributions are affected more by the budgetary systems when the target did not manage earnings than when the manager did. We also found that morality judgments were significantly associated with the target manager's behavior, but not with the budgetary system. In addition, participants' judgments about the target manager's reputation were more strongly associated with morality judgments than with causal attributions. We discuss implications of the role of reputation in management control systems design.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)149-164
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Business Ethics
Volume74
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2007

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moral judgement
attribution
manager
management
internal labor market
morality
reputation
control system
Earnings management
Managers
Moral judgment
Causal attributions
Causal
Attribution
Moral Judgment
budgetary control
scandal
penalty

Keywords

  • Budgetary control system
  • Causal attributions
  • Earnings management
  • Moral judgment
  • Work history

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Moral judgment and causal attributions : Consequences of engaging in earnings management. / Kaplan, Steven; McElroy, James C.; Ravenscroft, Susan P.; Shrader, Charles B.

In: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 74, No. 2, 08.2007, p. 149-164.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kaplan, Steven ; McElroy, James C. ; Ravenscroft, Susan P. ; Shrader, Charles B. / Moral judgment and causal attributions : Consequences of engaging in earnings management. In: Journal of Business Ethics. 2007 ; Vol. 74, No. 2. pp. 149-164.
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