Modified Occam's Razor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to the principle Grice calls 'Modified Occam's Razor' (MOR), 'Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity'. More carefully, MOR says that if there are distinct ways in which an expression is regularly used, then, all other things being equal, we should favour the view that the expression is unambiguous and that certain uses of it can be explained in pragmatic terms. In this paper I argue that MOR cannot have the central role that is typically assigned to it by those who deploy it. More specifically, I argue that potential justifications of the epistemic import of parsimony in semantic theorizing are problematic, and that even if MOR could be justified, it has a redundant role to play in adjudicating the debate between the ambiguity-theorist and the proponent of the pragmatic approach.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)371-382
Number of pages12
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume90
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2012
Externally publishedYes

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Theorists
Import
Justification
Parsimony

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Modified Occam's Razor. / Phillips, Ben.

In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 2, 01.06.2012, p. 371-382.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Phillips, Ben. / Modified Occam's Razor. In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2012 ; Vol. 90, No. 2. pp. 371-382.
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