Mitigating the CACHEKIT attack

Mauricio Gutierrez, Ziming Zhao, Adam Doupé, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Gail-Joon Ahn

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Through thorough research and experimentation, we arrive at the optimal defense mechanism that we call CACHELIGHT, a lightweight approach for preventing malicious abuse of cache -locking mechanisms. This novel solution leverages both the TZ and virtualization extensions in the ARM architecture to address the vulnerability identified by CACHEKIT. In this chapter, we cover the design, implementation, and implications of CACHELIGHT and how it is used to allow legitimate users to continue to utilize cache locking while giving SW the power to ensure system security by controlling and verifying the use of said mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationFrontiers in Hardware Security and Trust
PublisherInstitution of Engineering and Technology
Pages173-196
Number of pages24
ISBN (Electronic)9781785619274
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2021

Keywords

  • ARM architecture
  • Cache storage
  • Cache-locking mechanisms
  • CACHEKIT attack mitigation
  • CACHELIGHT
  • Data security
  • File organisation
  • Lightweight approach
  • Malicious abuse prevention
  • Optimal defense mechanism
  • Security of data
  • System security
  • Virtualization extensions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

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