Max-flow min-cut for power system security index computation

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The security index problem for false data injection attacks on power systems is considered. In particular, the problem is to find the minimum cost set of bus injection meters and line flow meters that an attacker can seize so as to execute a false data injection. A polynomial-time algorithm is provided to solve this problem in certain settings, based on the principle of max-flow min-cut. The security index problem is shown to be equivalent to a min-cut problem, and that this problem can be solved using a generalization of the classic max-flow min-cut algorithm in which flows are successively augmented until doing so is no longer possible.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages61-64
Number of pages4
ISBN (Print)9781479914814
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event2014 IEEE 8th Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop, SAM 2014 - A Coruna, Spain
Duration: Jun 22 2014Jun 25 2014

Other

Other2014 IEEE 8th Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop, SAM 2014
CountrySpain
CityA Coruna
Period6/22/146/25/14

Fingerprint

Security systems
Polynomials
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Kosut, O. (2014). Max-flow min-cut for power system security index computation. In Proceedings of the IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop (pp. 61-64). [6882338] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/SAM.2014.6882338

Max-flow min-cut for power system security index computation. / Kosut, Oliver.

Proceedings of the IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. p. 61-64 6882338.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kosut, O 2014, Max-flow min-cut for power system security index computation. in Proceedings of the IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop., 6882338, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 61-64, 2014 IEEE 8th Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop, SAM 2014, A Coruna, Spain, 6/22/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/SAM.2014.6882338
Kosut O. Max-flow min-cut for power system security index computation. In Proceedings of the IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop. IEEE Computer Society. 2014. p. 61-64. 6882338 https://doi.org/10.1109/SAM.2014.6882338
Kosut, Oliver. / Max-flow min-cut for power system security index computation. Proceedings of the IEEE Sensor Array and Multichannel Signal Processing Workshop. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. pp. 61-64
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