Marriage, morality, and institutional value

Elizabeth Brake

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The account I give is drawn from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O'Neill. Throughout, I use marriage as an example.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)243-254
Number of pages12
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volume10
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2007
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

morality
marriage
justice
Values
intuition
metaphysics
Morality
Immanuel Kant
Justice
Marriage
Intuition
Consequentialist
Barbara Herman
Metaphysics of Morals
Moral Values

Keywords

  • Deontology
  • Institution
  • Kant
  • Marriage
  • Rights
  • Value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Marriage, morality, and institutional value. / Brake, Elizabeth.

In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 10, No. 3, 06.2007, p. 243-254.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Brake, Elizabeth. / Marriage, morality, and institutional value. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2007 ; Vol. 10, No. 3. pp. 243-254.
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