Abstract
We study a class of discounted, infinite horizon stochastic games with public and private signals and strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the function space of values and strategies (equipped with a product order), we prove existence of a stationary Markov-Nash equilibrium via constructive methods. In addition, we provide monotone comparative statics results for ordered perturbations of our space of games. We present examples from industrial organization literature and discuss possible extensions of our techniques for studying principal-agent models.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 187-206 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Dynamic Games and Applications |
Volume | 3 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2013 |
Keywords
- Constructive methods
- Incomplete information
- Short memory (Markov) equilibria
- Stochastic games
- Supermodular games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Computer Science Applications
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Computational Mathematics
- Applied Mathematics