Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett, Łukasz Woźny

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a class of discounted, infinite horizon stochastic games with public and private signals and strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the function space of values and strategies (equipped with a product order), we prove existence of a stationary Markov-Nash equilibrium via constructive methods. In addition, we provide monotone comparative statics results for ordered perturbations of our space of games. We present examples from industrial organization literature and discuss possible extensions of our techniques for studying principal-agent models.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)187-206
Number of pages20
JournalDynamic Games and Applications
Volume3
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2013

Keywords

  • Constructive methods
  • Incomplete information
  • Short memory (Markov) equilibria
  • Stochastic games
  • Supermodular games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

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