Lobbies and technology diffusion

Diego Comin, Bart Hobijn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores whether lobbies slow down technology diffusion. To answer this question, we exploit the differential effect of various institutional attributes that should affect the costs of erecting barriers when the new technology has a technologically close predecessor but not otherwise. We implement this test using a data set that covers the diffusion of twenty technologies for 23 countries over the past two centuries. We find that each of the relevant institutional variables that affect the costs of erecting barriers has a significantly larger effect on the diffusion of technologies with a competing predecessor technology than when no such technology exists. These effects are quantitatively important. Thus, we conclude that lobbies are an important barrier to technology adoption and to development.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)229-244
Number of pages16
JournalReview of Economics and Statistics
Volume91
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2009
Externally publishedYes

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Lobbies
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Lobbies and technology diffusion. / Comin, Diego; Hobijn, Bart.

In: Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 91, No. 2, 05.2009, p. 229-244.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Comin, Diego ; Hobijn, Bart. / Lobbies and technology diffusion. In: Review of Economics and Statistics. 2009 ; Vol. 91, No. 2. pp. 229-244.
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