Limiting false data attacks on power system state estimation

Oliver Kosut, Liyan Jia, Robert J. Thomas, Lang Tong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

85 Scopus citations

Abstract

Malicious attacks against power system state estimation are considered. It has been recently observed that if an adversary is able to manipulate the measurements taken at several meters in a power system, it can sometimes change the state estimate at the control center in a way that will never be detected by classical bad data detectors. However, in cases when the adversary is not able to perform this attack, it was not clear what attacks might look like. An easily computable heuristic is developed to find bad adversarial attacks in all cases. This heuristic recovers the undetectable attacks, but it will also find the most damaging attack in all cases. In addition, a Bayesian formulation of the bad data problem is introduced, which captures the prior information that a control center has about the likely state of the power system. This formulation softens the impact of undetectable attacks. Finally, a new L norm detector is introduced, and it is demonstrated that it outperforms more standard L2 norm based detectors by taking advantage of the inherent sparsity of the false data injection.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2010
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 24 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2010 - Princeton, NJ, United States
Duration: Mar 17 2010Mar 19 2010

Publication series

Name2010 44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2010

Other

Other44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2010
CountryUnited States
CityPrinceton, NJ
Period3/17/103/19/10

Keywords

  • False data attack
  • Power system security
  • Power system state estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems
  • Information Systems and Management

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  • Cite this

    Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2010). Limiting false data attacks on power system state estimation. In 2010 44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2010 [5464816] (2010 44th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2010). https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2010.5464816