Legal moralism and retribution revisited

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    15 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This is a slightly revised text of Jeffrie G. Murphy's Presidential Address delivered to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, in March 2006. In the essay the author reconsiders two positions he had previously defended - the liberal attack on legal moralism and robust versions of the retributive theory of punishment - and now finds these positions much more vulnerable to legitimate attack than he had previously realized. In the first part of the essay, he argues that the use of Mill's liberal harm principle against legal moralism cannot be cabined in such a way as to leave intact other positions that many liberals want to defend - in particular, certain fundamental constitutional rights and character retributivism in criminal sentencing. In the second part of the essay, he expresses serious doubts - some inspired by Nietzsche - about the versions of character retributivism that he had once enthusiastically defended and now describes himself as no more than a "reluctant retributivist."

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)5-20
    Number of pages16
    JournalCriminal Law and Philosophy
    Volume1
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 2007

    Fingerprint

    penalty
    Retribution
    Legal Moralism
    Retributivism
    Attack
    American philosophical Association
    Friedrich Nietzsche
    Punishment
    Sentencing
    Presidential Address
    Fundamental
    Harm Principle

    Keywords

    • Legal moralism
    • Nietzsche
    • Retribution

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Law
    • Philosophy

    Cite this

    Legal moralism and retribution revisited. / Murphy, Jeffrie.

    In: Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 01.2007, p. 5-20.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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