Learning, signaling, and social preferences in public-good games

Marcus Janssen, T. K. Ahn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

52 Scopus citations


This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of others and are belief learners. Despite these interesting findings, we conclude that a powerful method of model selection of agent-based models on dynamic social dilemma experiments is still lacking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number21
JournalEcology and Society
Issue number2
StatePublished - Dec 2006


  • Agent-based model
  • Laboratory experiments
  • Learning
  • Public goods
  • Social preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Ecology


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