lead Independent Directors

Good governance or window dressing?

Phillip Lamoreaux, Lubomir P. Litov, Landon M. Mauler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We document the emergence of the Lead Independent Director (LID) board role in a sample of U.S. firms from 1999–2015. We find that firms that adopt an LID board role are larger and have more independent boards, higher institutional investor holdings, and an NYSE listing. Firms with greater anticipated benefits from monitoring also adopt an LID role, e.g., firms with dual CEO-Chairman, with more takeover defense mechanisms, and with higher cash holdings. Using an event study methodology, we find that investors respond positively to the adoption of an LID board role. Lastly, using instrumental variables to address endogeneity in the LID board role, we find that firms with an LID are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that the LID board role enhances firm value and improves the quality of corporate governance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)47-69
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Accounting Literature
Volume43
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2019

Fingerprint

Window dressing
Independent directors
Board roles
Chief executive officer
Cash holdings
Investors
Endogeneity
Event study methodology
Institutional investors
Instrumental variables
Chairmen
Firm value
New York Stock Exchange
Takeover defenses
Corporate governance
Monitoring

Keywords

  • Board structure
  • CEO-Chairman
  • Independent directors
  • Lead Independent Director

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting

Cite this

lead Independent Directors : Good governance or window dressing? / Lamoreaux, Phillip; Litov, Lubomir P.; Mauler, Landon M.

In: Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 43, 01.12.2019, p. 47-69.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lamoreaux, Phillip ; Litov, Lubomir P. ; Mauler, Landon M. / lead Independent Directors : Good governance or window dressing?. In: Journal of Accounting Literature. 2019 ; Vol. 43. pp. 47-69.
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