Job Design in the Presence of Career Concerns

Pablo Casas-Arce, Santhi Hejeebu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom to include career concerns. When agents are motivated by their reputation, the discretion to pursue outside activities plays an integral part in the incentive scheme. Discretion can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low-ability agents. We argue that these synergies are useful in explaining, among other examples, the employment of US faculty members and of physicians in dual health care systems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1083-1109
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume21
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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