Job Design in the Presence of Career Concerns

Pablo Casas Arce, Santhi Hejeebu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom to include career concerns. When agents are motivated by their reputation, the discretion to pursue outside activities plays an integral part in the incentive scheme. Discretion can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low-ability agents. We argue that these synergies are useful in explaining, among other examples, the employment of US faculty members and of physicians in dual health care systems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1083-1109
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume21
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Health care
Job design
Discretion
Career concerns
Synergy
Adverse selection
Incentives
Health care system
Integral
Design theory
Physicians
Incentive schemes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Job Design in the Presence of Career Concerns. / Casas Arce, Pablo; Hejeebu, Santhi.

In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 21, No. 4, 12.2012, p. 1083-1109.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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