It's alright, it's just a bluff: Why do corporate codes reduce lying, but not bluffing?

Jörg R. Rottenburger, Craig Carter, Lutz Kaufmann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Purchasing operates in an environment that frequently provides incentives for deception. Using self-concept maintenance theory and social learning theory, this article compares two distinct manifestations of deception in buyer–supplier negotiations: lying and bluffing. Scenario-based experiments provide evidence that corporate codes diminish severe manifestations of deception (lying) but not less severe ones (bluffing), and that bluffing is considered a negotiation skill. These findings reveal the boundary conditions of self-concept maintenance theory, which is applicable to lying but not to bluffing. Moreover, this article outlines an agenda for future research on deception in buyer–supplier relationships – an important but under-researched subject within our discipline.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Purchasing and Supply Management
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Deception
Self-concept
Social learning
Agenda
Learning theory
Scenarios
Experiment
Boundary conditions
Incentives
Buyer-supplier relationships
Purchasing

Keywords

  • Behavioral Supply Management
  • Deception
  • Negotiation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Strategy and Management
  • Marketing

Cite this

It's alright, it's just a bluff : Why do corporate codes reduce lying, but not bluffing? / Rottenburger, Jörg R.; Carter, Craig; Kaufmann, Lutz.

In: Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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