Irrigation experiments in the lab

Trust, environmental variability, and collective action

Jacopo A. Baggio, Nathan D. Rollins, Irene Pérez, Marcus Janssen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number12
JournalEcology and Society
Volume20
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

Fingerprint

collective action
irrigation
resource
experiment
resource availability
water resource
rainfall
effect

Keywords

  • Asymmetry
  • Common-pool resources
  • Feedbacks
  • Laboratory experiments
  • Trust
  • Variability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Ecology

Cite this

Irrigation experiments in the lab : Trust, environmental variability, and collective action. / Baggio, Jacopo A.; Rollins, Nathan D.; Pérez, Irene; Janssen, Marcus.

In: Ecology and Society, Vol. 20, No. 4, 12, 2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Baggio, Jacopo A. ; Rollins, Nathan D. ; Pérez, Irene ; Janssen, Marcus. / Irrigation experiments in the lab : Trust, environmental variability, and collective action. In: Ecology and Society. 2015 ; Vol. 20, No. 4.
@article{e1ecc5aea2204dbe87f9928df7213113,
title = "Irrigation experiments in the lab: Trust, environmental variability, and collective action",
abstract = "Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.",
keywords = "Asymmetry, Common-pool resources, Feedbacks, Laboratory experiments, Trust, Variability",
author = "Baggio, {Jacopo A.} and Rollins, {Nathan D.} and Irene P{\'e}rez and Marcus Janssen",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.5751/ES-07772-200412",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "20",
journal = "Ecology and Society",
issn = "1708-3087",
publisher = "The Resilience Alliance",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Irrigation experiments in the lab

T2 - Trust, environmental variability, and collective action

AU - Baggio, Jacopo A.

AU - Rollins, Nathan D.

AU - Pérez, Irene

AU - Janssen, Marcus

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.

AB - Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.

KW - Asymmetry

KW - Common-pool resources

KW - Feedbacks

KW - Laboratory experiments

KW - Trust

KW - Variability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84953250674&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84953250674&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.5751/ES-07772-200412

DO - 10.5751/ES-07772-200412

M3 - Article

VL - 20

JO - Ecology and Society

JF - Ecology and Society

SN - 1708-3087

IS - 4

M1 - 12

ER -