Introducing regulatory intermediaries

Kenneth Abbott, David Levi-Faur, Duncan Snidal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

42 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Regulation is frequently viewed as a twoparty relationship between a regulator (R) and the targets of its regulation (T). This volume conceives of regulation as a three-party system, in which intermediaries (I) provide assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their own capabilities, authority, and legitimacy. Our framework article for the volume, “Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model,” sets out a general theoretical model for analyzing the roles and implications of regulatory intermediaries in diverse settings. Examples of this three-party RIT model of regulation abound. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) supplements its own inspectors by engaging private auditors to monitor food imports, and empowers other private bodies to accredit auditors (Lytton, this volume). Private transnational regulatory schemes such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and Fairtrade International (FLO) also rely on independent auditors and accreditors (Auld and Renckens, this volume; Loconto, this volume).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)6-13
Number of pages8
JournalAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Volume670
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

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regulation
party system
supplement
import
legitimacy
assistance
food

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Introducing regulatory intermediaries. / Abbott, Kenneth; Levi-Faur, David; Snidal, Duncan.

In: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 670, No. 1, 2017, p. 6-13.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abbott, Kenneth ; Levi-Faur, David ; Snidal, Duncan. / Introducing regulatory intermediaries. In: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2017 ; Vol. 670, No. 1. pp. 6-13.
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