Intrinsic value for pragmatists?

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental pragmatists balk at the mere mention of intrinsic value. Indeed, the leading expositor of the pragmatic position in environmental philosophy, Bryan Norton, has delivered withering criticisms of the concept as it has been employed by nonanthropocentrists in the field. Nevertheless, I believe that Norton has left an opening for a recognition of intrinsic value in his arguments, albeit a version that bears little resemblance to most of its traditional incarnations. Drawing from John Dewey's contextual approach toward moral inquiry, I offer a reconstructed notion of intrinsic value that avoids the metaphysical pitfalls identified by Norton. I argue that this contextual understanding of noninstrumental claims has the advantage of turning our attention toward, and not away from, the critical realm of practice and policy, and that it is especially compatible with the norms of democratic deliberation. By way of example and in defense of my position, I conclude with a rejoinder to Holmes Rolston's claims about the role of foundational intrinsic value commitments in settling the human-nature dilemma at Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)57-75
Number of pages19
JournalEnvironmental Ethics
Volume23
Issue number1
StatePublished - Mar 2001
Externally publishedYes

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national park
defence
norm
policy
Intrinsic Value
Pragmatist
Contextual

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Intrinsic value for pragmatists? / Minteer, Ben.

In: Environmental Ethics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 03.2001, p. 57-75.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Minteer, Ben. / Intrinsic value for pragmatists?. In: Environmental Ethics. 2001 ; Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 57-75.
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