Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibria: An illustration

Tito Cordella, Manjira Datta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)137-153
Number of pages17
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

Fingerprint

Walras equilibrium
Cournot equilibrium
Cournot
Aggregate consumption
Inefficiency
General equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibria : An illustration. / Cordella, Tito; Datta, Manjira.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, p. 137-153.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{5490295cdc104df9a5def62ec1f321ff,
title = "Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibria: An illustration",
abstract = "In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount).",
author = "Tito Cordella and Manjira Datta",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00006",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "43",
pages = "137--153",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibria

T2 - An illustration

AU - Cordella, Tito

AU - Datta, Manjira

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount).

AB - In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount).

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036047798&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0036047798&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00006

DO - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00006

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0036047798

VL - 43

SP - 137

EP - 153

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

IS - 1

ER -