Institutions, Parasites and the Persistence of In-group Preferences

Daniel Hruschka, Joseph Henrich

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Much research has established reliable cross-population differences in motivations to invest in one's in-group. We compare two current historical-evolutionary hypotheses for this variation based on (1) effective large-scale institutions and (2) pathogen threats by analyzing cross-national differences (N = 122) in in-group preferences measured in three ways. We find that the effectiveness of government institutions correlates with favoring in-group members, even when controlling for pathogen stress and world region, assessing reverse causality, and providing a check on endogeneity with an instrumental variable analysis. Conversely, pathogen stress shows inconsistent associations with in-group favoritism when controlling for government effectiveness. Moreover, pathogen stress shows little to no association with in-group favoritism within major world regions whereas government effectiveness does. These results suggest that variation in in-group preferences across contemporary nation-states is more consistent with a generalized response to institutions that meet basic needs rather than an evolved response dedicated to pathogens.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numbere63642
JournalPLoS One
Volume8
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 21 2013

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Pathogens
Parasites
parasites
pathogens
Causality
Research
Population

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Medicine(all)

Cite this

Institutions, Parasites and the Persistence of In-group Preferences. / Hruschka, Daniel; Henrich, Joseph.

In: PLoS One, Vol. 8, No. 5, e63642, 21.05.2013.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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