Information on the nature of the game as a determinant of behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma

David Mack, George P. Knight

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Fifty male and 50 female Ss play ed single trials of six prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs) in each of two experimental conditions (ECs). In EC1, Ss read a descriptive matrix prior to playing. In EC2, no descriptive matrix was presented. Within each EC, two forms of matrix were employed: (A) where strategies were explicitly labeled COOPERATION and COMPETITION and (B) where strategies were identified by letters only. No significant sex differences were found. Significant differences were found in competitive behavior: EC1A > EC1B and EC1A > EC2A. The findings indicate that increased information results in increased competition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)99-100
Number of pages2
JournalPsychonomic Science
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1972
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Catalysis
  • Chemistry(all)

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