INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, MANUFACTURER–RETAILER CONTRACTS, AND TWO-SIDED ENTRY

Tat Chan, Alvin Murphy, Li Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We investigate the economic determinants of contract structure and entry with transfer contracts, which specify that manufacturers directly sell their products in retail stores while retailers collect sales revenue and return a transfer to the manufacturers. Using a unique data set describing entry decisions of clothing manufacturers into a retail department store, we estimate a two-sided, asymmetric-information entry model. We compare profit estimates under transfer contracts to counterfactual profit estimates under common alternative contract formats. Results show that, when adverse selection is present, transfer contracts dominate other contract formats from the retailer's perspective; otherwise, the common alternative contract formats dominate.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2163-2191
Number of pages29
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume59
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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