Inflation targeting as a way of precommitment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announced inflation target to an instrument-independent central bank, but retains the discretion to revise the inflation target after wages have been set. We argue that since this arrangement is transparent, it solves Canzoneri's private information problem, ensures perfect monitoring of the government, and makes reputational forces more effective. Cases are characterized in which, for this reason, inflation targeting mitigates the inflationary bias of monetary policy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)431-448
Number of pages18
JournalOxford Economic Papers
Volume50
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1998
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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