Incentive design for Direct Load Control programs

Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Yuanzhang Xiao, Anna Scaglione, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of optimal incentive design for voluntary participation of electricity customers in a Direct Load Scheduling (DLS) program, a new form of Direct Load Control (DLC) based on a three way communication protocol between customers, embedded controls in flexible appliances, and the central entity in charge of the program. Participation decisions are made in real-time on an event-based basis, with every customer that needs to use a flexible appliance considering whether to join the program given current incentives. Customers have different interpretations of the level of risk associated with committing to pass over the control over the consumption schedule of their devices to an operator, and these risk levels are only privately known. The operator maximizes his expected profit of operating the DLS program by posting the right participation incentives for different appliance types, in a publicly available and dynamically updated table. Customers are then faced with the dynamic decision making problem of whether to take the incentives and participate or not. We define an optimization framework to determine the profit-maximizing incentives for the operator. In doing so, we also investigate the utility that the operator expects to gain from recruiting different types of devices. These utilities also provide an upper-bound on the benefits that can be attained from any type of demand response program.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages1029-1036
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781479934096
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 2 2013Oct 4 2013

Other

Other51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period10/2/1310/4/13

Fingerprint

Mathematical operators
Profitability
Scheduling
Electricity
Decision making
Network protocols
Optimal design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Alizadeh, M., Xiao, Y., Scaglione, A., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2013). Incentive design for Direct Load Control programs. In 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 (pp. 1029-1036). [6736638] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736638

Incentive design for Direct Load Control programs. / Alizadeh, Mahnoosh; Xiao, Yuanzhang; Scaglione, Anna; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013. IEEE Computer Society, 2013. p. 1029-1036 6736638.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Alizadeh, M, Xiao, Y, Scaglione, A & Van Der Schaar, M 2013, Incentive design for Direct Load Control programs. in 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013., 6736638, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 1029-1036, 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013, Monticello, IL, United States, 10/2/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736638
Alizadeh M, Xiao Y, Scaglione A, Van Der Schaar M. Incentive design for Direct Load Control programs. In 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013. IEEE Computer Society. 2013. p. 1029-1036. 6736638 https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736638
Alizadeh, Mahnoosh ; Xiao, Yuanzhang ; Scaglione, Anna ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Incentive design for Direct Load Control programs. 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013. IEEE Computer Society, 2013. pp. 1029-1036
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