Impact of link deletions on public cooperation in scale-free networks

Luo Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, Wen Xu Wang, Ying-Cheng Lai, Bing Hong Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Working together in groups may be beneficial if compared to isolated efforts. Yet this is true only if all group members contribute to the success. If not, group efforts may act detrimentally on the fitness of their members. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in public-goods games on scale-free networks that are subject to deletion of links connected to the highest-degree individuals, i.e., on network that are under attack. We focus on the case where all groups a player belongs to are considered for the determination of payoffs; the so-called multi-group public-goods games. We find that the effect of link deletions on the evolution of cooperation is predominantly detrimental, although there exist regions of the multiplication factor where the existence of an "optimal" number of removed links for the deterioration of cooperation can also be demonstrated. The findings are explained by means of wealth distributions and analytical approximations, confirming that socially diverse states are crucial for the successful evolution of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number40001
JournalEPL
Volume93
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2011

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deletion
games
fitness
deterioration
multiplication
attack
approximation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

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Impact of link deletions on public cooperation in scale-free networks. / Jiang, Luo Luo; Perc, Matjaž; Wang, Wen Xu; Lai, Ying-Cheng; Wang, Bing Hong.

In: EPL, Vol. 93, No. 4, 40001, 02.2011.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Jiang, Luo Luo ; Perc, Matjaž ; Wang, Wen Xu ; Lai, Ying-Cheng ; Wang, Bing Hong. / Impact of link deletions on public cooperation in scale-free networks. In: EPL. 2011 ; Vol. 93, No. 4.
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