Identifying an Exploitable Structure for the Core Problem of Load-Redistribution Attack Problems

Ramin Kaviani, Kory W. Hedman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Ahstract-This study identifies and proposes an exploitable linear programming model for the core problem of sophisticated attacker-defender load-redistribution (LR) attack problems. This model is developed by leveraging power system domain insight and fundamental knowledge of the physics laws in power systems. The main contribution of this study is to demonstrate the point that there is no reason to solve any complicated problem for attackers in LR attack problems since the attackers' strategy is strikingly simple and trivial for this type of attack, which could be the basis of developing detection mechanisms against this type of cyber-attacks. We applied the proposed model to the IEEE 118-Bus test case to create an LR attack and demonstrate its impact in order to show the applicability and accuracy of our work.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication51st North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781728104072
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event51st North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2019 - Wichita, United States
Duration: Oct 13 2019Oct 15 2019

Publication series

Name51st North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2019

Conference

Conference51st North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityWichita
Period10/13/1910/15/19

Keywords

  • cyber-attack
  • false data injection attack (FDIA)
  • linear programming (LP)
  • load-redistribution (LR) attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

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