Human cooperation

Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)

Karthik Panchanathan, Robert Boyd

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats. Unlike direct punishment, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)126
Number of pages1
JournalNature
Volume437
Issue number7058
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 22 2005
Externally publishedYes

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  • General

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Human cooperation : Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply). / Panchanathan, Karthik; Boyd, Robert.

In: Nature, Vol. 437, No. 7058, 22.09.2005, p. 126.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Panchanathan, Karthik ; Boyd, Robert. / Human cooperation : Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply). In: Nature. 2005 ; Vol. 437, No. 7058. pp. 126.
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