Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)

Karthik Panchanathan; Robert Boyd

doi:10.1038/nature04202

Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)

Karthik Panchanathan, Robert Boyd

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats. Unlike direct punishment, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	126
Number of pages	1
Journal	Nature
Volume	437
Issue number	7058
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04202
State	Published - Sep 22 2005
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Medicine
General

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10.1038/nature04202

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title = "Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)",

abstract = "We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats. Unlike direct punishment, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.",

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AB - We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats. Unlike direct punishment, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.

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Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)

Abstract

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