Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)

Karthik Panchanathan, Robert Boyd

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats. Unlike direct punishment, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)126
Number of pages1
JournalNature
Volume437
Issue number7058
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 22 2005
Externally publishedYes

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Medicine(all)
  • General

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