How Have Political Incentives for Local Officials Reduced the Environmental Pollution of Resource-depleted Cities?

Chinese resource-exhausted cities face more severe environmental pollution problems than other cities. In addressing these problems, the way local officials, usually senior party and government leaders, operate, is very important, in that their focus on political achievements may complicate how they manage environmental pollution in these cities. Based on this, we analyze the relationship between political incentives and environmental pollution by applying the 2004-2014 panel data from 37 resource-exhausted cities. The findings reveal that: (1) Local openness levels, degree of industrial upgrading and local investment in fixed assets are not the key variables in environmental pollution control. (2) The extent to which officials vie for political achievement affects environmental pollution in resource-exhausted cities. It depends on whether the officials are municipal party secretaries or mayors; the former play a greater dynamic role in environmental pollution and have a stronger robustness than the latter. The conclusion verifies that the selection of municipal party secretaries, rather than mayors, is particularly important in coming to terms with local environmental pollution.