How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Although scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators’ focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators’ attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non-elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)623-637
Number of pages15
JournalPublic Administration
Volume95
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2017
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this