Hop chains

Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities

Rida Bazzi, Young Ri Choi, Mohamed G. Gouda

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a secure routing protocol that is immune to Sybil attacks, and that can tolerate initial collusion of Byzantine routers, or runtime collusion of non-adjacent Byzantine routers in the absence of collusion between adjacent routers. For these settings, the calculated distance from a destination to a node is not smaller than the actual shortest distance from the destination to the node. The protocol can also tolerate initial collusion of Byzantine routers and runtime collusion of adjacent Byzantine routers but in the absence of runtime collusion between non-adjacent routers. For this setting, there is a bound on how short the calculated distance is compared to the actual shortest distance. The protocol makes very weak timing assumptions and requires synchronization only between neighbors or second neighbors. We propose to use this protocol for secure localization of routers using hop-count distances, which can be then used as a proof of identity of nodes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Pages365-379
Number of pages15
Volume4305 LNCS
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006
Event10th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, OPODIS 2006 - Bordeaux, France
Duration: Dec 12 2006Dec 15 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4305 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other10th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, OPODIS 2006
CountryFrance
CityBordeaux
Period12/12/0612/15/06

Fingerprint

Collusion
Router
Routers
Routing
Distinct
Network protocols
Adjacent
Vertex of a graph
Routing Protocol
Routing protocols
Timing
Synchronization
Count
Attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Bazzi, R., Choi, Y. R., & Gouda, M. G. (2006). Hop chains: Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4305 LNCS, pp. 365-379). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4305 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/11945529-26

Hop chains : Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities. / Bazzi, Rida; Choi, Young Ri; Gouda, Mohamed G.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 4305 LNCS 2006. p. 365-379 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4305 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Bazzi, R, Choi, YR & Gouda, MG 2006, Hop chains: Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities. in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). vol. 4305 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4305 LNCS, pp. 365-379, 10th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, OPODIS 2006, Bordeaux, France, 12/12/06. https://doi.org/10.1007/11945529-26
Bazzi R, Choi YR, Gouda MG. Hop chains: Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 4305 LNCS. 2006. p. 365-379. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/11945529-26
Bazzi, Rida ; Choi, Young Ri ; Gouda, Mohamed G. / Hop chains : Secure routing and the establishment of distinct identities. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 4305 LNCS 2006. pp. 365-379 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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