Hidden flexibility: Institutions, incentives, and the margins of selectivity in fishing

Joshua Abbott, Alan C. Haynie, Matthew N. Reimer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and finescale spatial decision making and avoidance of nightfishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)169-195
Number of pages27
JournalLand Economics
Volume91
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2015

Fingerprint

incentive
fishing
fishery
catch composition
bycatch
decision making
Selectivity
Fishing
Fisheries
Margin
Incentives
policy
Policy design
Incentive structure
Production technology
Bycatch
Avoidance
Common pool
Decision making

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Hidden flexibility : Institutions, incentives, and the margins of selectivity in fishing. / Abbott, Joshua; Haynie, Alan C.; Reimer, Matthew N.

In: Land Economics, Vol. 91, No. 1, 2015, p. 169-195.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abbott, Joshua ; Haynie, Alan C. ; Reimer, Matthew N. / Hidden flexibility : Institutions, incentives, and the margins of selectivity in fishing. In: Land Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 91, No. 1. pp. 169-195.
@article{d39302f00aaa4a059d02c8d0273b9dc6,
title = "Hidden flexibility: Institutions, incentives, and the margins of selectivity in fishing",
abstract = "The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and finescale spatial decision making and avoidance of nightfishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies.",
author = "Joshua Abbott and Haynie, {Alan C.} and Reimer, {Matthew N.}",
year = "2015",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "91",
pages = "169--195",
journal = "Land Economics",
issn = "0023-7639",
publisher = "University of Wisconsin Press",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Hidden flexibility

T2 - Institutions, incentives, and the margins of selectivity in fishing

AU - Abbott, Joshua

AU - Haynie, Alan C.

AU - Reimer, Matthew N.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and finescale spatial decision making and avoidance of nightfishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies.

AB - The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and finescale spatial decision making and avoidance of nightfishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84921681082&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84921681082&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84921681082

VL - 91

SP - 169

EP - 195

JO - Land Economics

JF - Land Economics

SN - 0023-7639

IS - 1

ER -