Hidden flexibility: Institutions, incentives, and the margins of selectivity in fishing

Joshua Abbott, Alan C. Haynie, Matthew N. Reimer

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    37 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and finescale spatial decision making and avoidance of nightfishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)169-195
    Number of pages27
    JournalLand Economics
    Volume91
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)
    • Economics and Econometrics

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