Abstract
Group testing offers a cost/time-beneficial method to identify all, but few, infected individuals (defective items in general) among a large set of individuals (items). In a group testing scheme, a series of tests are performed on groups of individuals rather than single individuals. A test on a group determines whether the group contains at least one infected individual. This paper investigates the classical group testing problem from a game-theoretic perspective, where every individual, once called for a test, decides to comply with or defy the call. In this framework, an individual's decision is driven by his knowledge of his well-being, that is healthy or infected. This leads to the so-called group testing game which is formulated in this work. Some simplified versions of the general game as a team game is then presented and analyzed, that result in some novel, generalized group testing problems to be addressed in future work.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 9668-9673 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | IFAC-PapersOnLine |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2017 |
Keywords
- Bayesian Games
- Game Theory
- Group Testing
- Nash Equilibrium
- Team Games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Systems Engineering