Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population

Robert Boyd, Peter J. Richerson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

211 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Group beneficial norms are common in human societies. The persistence of such norms is consistent with evolutionary game theory, but existing models do not provide a plausible explanation for why they are common. We show that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions. We also show that this mechanism allows recombination of different group beneficial norms arising in different populations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)287-296
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume215
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

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Structured Populations
Game Theory
Norm
game theory
Game theory
Genetic Recombination
Population
population structure
population dynamics
Replicator Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Theory
Population Structure
Imitation
Recombination
Persistence
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)

Cite this

Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population. / Boyd, Robert; Richerson, Peter J.

In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 215, No. 3, 2002, p. 287-296.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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