GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures

Fakhri Saadedeen; Anamitra Pal

doi:10.1109/NAPS52732.2021.9654472

GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures

Fakhri Saadedeen, Anamitra Pal

Engineering, Ira A. Fulton Schools of (IAFSE)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Prior research has demonstrated that global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units (PMUs) can cripple power system operation. This paper provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). It also introduces a novel countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMU's current output. This countermeasure is a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781665420815
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/NAPS52732.2021.9654472
State	Published - 2021
Event	2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021 - College Station, United States Duration: Nov 14 2021 → Nov 16 2021

Publication series

Name	2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021

Conference

Conference	2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021
Country/Territory	United States
City	College Station
Period	11/14/21 → 11/16/21

Keywords

Global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks
Low power long range (LoRa) signal
Phasor measurement unit (PMU)
software defined radios (SDRs)

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Information Systems and Management
Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Control and Optimization

Access to Document

10.1109/NAPS52732.2021.9654472

Cite this

GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures. / Saadedeen, Fakhri; Pal, Anamitra.
2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021. (2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Saadedeen, F & Pal, A 2021, GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures. in 2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021. 2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2021, College Station, United States, 11/14/21. https://doi.org/10.1109/NAPS52732.2021.9654472

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title = "GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures",

abstract = "Prior research has demonstrated that global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units (PMUs) can cripple power system operation. This paper provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). It also introduces a novel countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMU's current output. This countermeasure is a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs.",

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N2 - Prior research has demonstrated that global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units (PMUs) can cripple power system operation. This paper provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). It also introduces a novel countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMU's current output. This countermeasure is a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs.

AB - Prior research has demonstrated that global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units (PMUs) can cripple power system operation. This paper provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). It also introduces a novel countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMU's current output. This countermeasure is a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs.

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GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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