TY - JOUR
T1 - From the Revolution to Embodiment
T2 - 25 Years of Cognitive Psychology
AU - Glenberg, Arthur
AU - Witt, Jessica K.
AU - Metcalfe, Janet
N1 - Funding Information:
In preparing this article, Arthur M. Glenberg was partially supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant Number 1020367), Jessica K. Witt was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant Number BCS-0957051), and Janet Metcalfe was supported by the James S. McDonnell Foundation (Grant Number 220020166). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies.
PY - 2013/9
Y1 - 2013/9
N2 - In 1988, the cognitive revolution had become institutionalized: Cognition was the manipulation of abstract symbols by rules. But, much like institutionalized political parties, some of the ideas were becoming stale. Where was action? Where was the self? How could cognition be smoothly integrated with emotions, with social psychology, with development, with clinical analyses? Around that time, thinkers in linguistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, biology, and psychology were formulating the idea that just as overt behavior depends on the specifics of the body in action, so might cognition depend on the body. Here we characterize (some would say caricature) the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive psychology of that era, and then we describe what has come to be called embodied cognition: how cognition arises through the dynamic interplay of brain controlling bodily action controlling perception, which changes the brain. We focus on the importance of action and how action shapes perception, the self, and language. Having the body in action as a central consideration for theories of cognition promises, we believe, to help unify psychology.
AB - In 1988, the cognitive revolution had become institutionalized: Cognition was the manipulation of abstract symbols by rules. But, much like institutionalized political parties, some of the ideas were becoming stale. Where was action? Where was the self? How could cognition be smoothly integrated with emotions, with social psychology, with development, with clinical analyses? Around that time, thinkers in linguistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, biology, and psychology were formulating the idea that just as overt behavior depends on the specifics of the body in action, so might cognition depend on the body. Here we characterize (some would say caricature) the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive psychology of that era, and then we describe what has come to be called embodied cognition: how cognition arises through the dynamic interplay of brain controlling bodily action controlling perception, which changes the brain. We focus on the importance of action and how action shapes perception, the self, and language. Having the body in action as a central consideration for theories of cognition promises, we believe, to help unify psychology.
KW - action
KW - cognition
KW - communication
KW - language
KW - memory
KW - performance
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U2 - 10.1177/1745691613498098
DO - 10.1177/1745691613498098
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84883766267
SN - 1745-6916
VL - 8
SP - 573
EP - 585
JO - Perspectives on Psychological Science
JF - Perspectives on Psychological Science
IS - 5
ER -