Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

Javier Donna; Pablo Schenone; Gregory Veramendi

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.033

Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

Javier Donna, Pablo Schenone, Gregory Veramendi

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	81-84
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	138
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.033
State	Published - Jan 1 2016

Keywords

Auctions
Frictions
Internet
Networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.033

Cite this

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title = "Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample",

abstract = "We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.",

keywords = "Auctions, Frictions, Internet, Networks",

author = "Javier Donna and Pablo Schenone and Gregory Veramendi",

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AU - Veramendi, Gregory

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N2 - We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.

AB - We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.

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KW - Networks

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Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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