Frameworks for Privacy-Preserving Mobile Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanisms

Jian Lin, Dejun Yang, Ming Li, Jia Xu, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

With the rapid growth of smartphones, mobile crowdsensing emerges as a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive sensor-embedded smartphones to collect data efficiently. Many auction-based incentive mechanisms have been proposed to stimulate smartphone users to participate in the mobile crowdsensing applications and systems. However, none of them has taken into consideration both the bid privacy of smartphone users and the social cost. In this paper, we design two frameworks for privacy-preserving auction-based incentive mechanisms that also achieve approximate social cost minimization. In the former, each user submits a bid for a set of tasks it is willing to perform; in the latter, each user submits a bid for each task in its task set. Both frameworks select users based on platform-defined score functions. As examples, we propose two score functions, linear and log functions, to realize the two frameworks. We rigorously prove that both proposed frameworks achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, differential privacy and approximate social cost minimization. In addition, with log score function, the two frameworks are asymptotically optimal in terms of the social cost. Extensive simulations evaluate the performance of the two frameworks and demonstrate that our frameworks achieve bid-privacy preservation although sacrificing social cost.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Dec 6 2017

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Smartphones
Costs
Computational efficiency
Sensors

Keywords

  • differential privacy
  • incentive mechanism
  • Minimization
  • Mobile communication
  • Mobile computing
  • Mobile crowdsensing
  • Privacy
  • Sensors
  • Smart phones

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Frameworks for Privacy-Preserving Mobile Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanisms. / Lin, Jian; Yang, Dejun; Li, Ming; Xu, Jia; Xue, Guoliang.

In: IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 06.12.2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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