Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest

Nathan T. Washburn, Mary Sully de Luque

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this study, we contrast the perceived self-interested behaviors of agent CEOs with founder CEOs. We also examine the relationship between these perceived CEO behaviors and employee self-interest. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that founder CEOs are more likely to display self-interest, and these behaviors are in turn related to employee self-interest.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAcademy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012
PublisherAcademy of Management
Pages1044-1049
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012 - Boston, United States
Duration: Aug 7 2012Aug 10 2012

Other

Other72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012
CountryUnited States
CityBoston
Period8/7/128/10/12

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Personnel
Chief executive officer
Founder CEO
Employees

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Industrial relations
  • Management Information Systems

Cite this

Washburn, N. T., & Sully de Luque, M. (2012). Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest. In Academy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012 (pp. 1044-1049). Academy of Management. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2012.279

Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest. / Washburn, Nathan T.; Sully de Luque, Mary.

Academy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012. Academy of Management, 2012. p. 1044-1049.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Washburn, NT & Sully de Luque, M 2012, Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest. in Academy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012. Academy of Management, pp. 1044-1049, 72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012, Boston, United States, 8/7/12. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2012.279
Washburn NT, Sully de Luque M. Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest. In Academy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012. Academy of Management. 2012. p. 1044-1049 https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2012.279
Washburn, Nathan T. ; Sully de Luque, Mary. / Founder CEO and agent CEO self-interest. Academy of Management 2012 Annual Meeting, AOM 2012. Academy of Management, 2012. pp. 1044-1049
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