Forward induction reasoning revisited

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Amanda Friedenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call extensive form best response sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely directed rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003). We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)57-98
Number of pages42
JournalTheoretical Economics
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

Keywords

  • Directed rationalizability
  • Epistemic game theory
  • Extensive form best response set
  • Forward induction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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    Battigalli, P., & Friedenberg, A. (2012). Forward induction reasoning revisited. Theoretical Economics, 7(1), 57-98. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE598