Abstract
This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 96-101 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Volume | 2018-January |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781538640555 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 17 2018 |
Event | 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017 - Dresden, Germany Duration: Oct 23 2017 → Oct 26 2017 |
Other
Other | 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017 |
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Country | Germany |
City | Dresden |
Period | 10/23/17 → 10/26/17 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Cite this
False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. / Zhang, Jiazi; Chu, Zhigang; Sankar, Lalitha; Kosut, Oliver.
2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 96-101.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition
AU - Zhang, Jiazi
AU - Chu, Zhigang
AU - Sankar, Lalitha
AU - Kosut, Oliver
PY - 2018/4/17
Y1 - 2018/4/17
N2 - This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.
AB - This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050940022&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85050940022&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85050940022
VL - 2018-January
SP - 96
EP - 101
BT - 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -