False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition

Jiazi Zhang; Zhigang Chu; Lalitha Sankar; Oliver Kosut

doi:10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729

False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition

Jiazi Zhang, Zhigang Chu, Lalitha Sankar, Oliver Kosut

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	96-101
Number of pages	6
Volume	2018-January
ISBN (Electronic)	9781538640555
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729
State	Published - Apr 17 2018
Event	2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017 - Dresden, Germany Duration: Oct 23 2017 → Oct 26 2017

Other

Other	2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017
Country	Germany
City	Dresden
Period	10/23/17 → 10/26/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Artificial Intelligence
Computer Networks and Communications
Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Access to Document

10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729

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Cite this

False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. / Zhang, Jiazi; Chu, Zhigang; Sankar, Lalitha ; Kosut, Oliver.

2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 96-101.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Zhang, J, Chu, Z, Sankar, L & Kosut, O 2018, False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 96-101, 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017, Dresden, Germany, 10/23/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729

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