False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition

Jiazi Zhang, Zhigang Chu, Lalitha Sankar, Oliver Kosut

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages96-101
Number of pages6
Volume2018-January
ISBN (Electronic)9781538640555
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 17 2018
Event2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017 - Dresden, Germany
Duration: Oct 23 2017Oct 26 2017

Other

Other2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017
CountryGermany
CityDresden
Period10/23/1710/26/17

Fingerprint

Phasor measurement units
Detectors
Decomposition
Convex optimization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Zhang, J., Chu, Z., Sankar, L., & Kosut, O. (2018). False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. In 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017 (Vol. 2018-January, pp. 96-101). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729

False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. / Zhang, Jiazi; Chu, Zhigang; Sankar, Lalitha; Kosut, Oliver.

2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 96-101.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhang, J, Chu, Z, Sankar, L & Kosut, O 2018, False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 96-101, 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017, Dresden, Germany, 10/23/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729
Zhang J, Chu Z, Sankar L, Kosut O. False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. In 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. Vol. 2018-January. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 96-101 https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2017.8340729
Zhang, Jiazi ; Chu, Zhigang ; Sankar, Lalitha ; Kosut, Oliver. / False data injection attacks on phasor measurements that bypass low-rank decomposition. 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 96-101
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