Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure

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1 Scopus citations

Abstract

I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form "S is pleased/glad that P" and "S is displeased/sad that P" should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman's examples. My interpretation is plausible in its own right. Moreover, it is significant within the context of the debate. It allows the attitudinal hedonist to preserve the initial understanding of happiness that Feldman believes is open to counterexample: that happiness is the sum of attitudinal pleasure minus attitudinal displeasure and that all attitudinal pleasure and displeasure counts equally in the aggregation that constitutes happiness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)277-291
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume159
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2012

Keywords

  • Attitudinal hedonism
  • Elijah Millgram's theory of practical induction
  • Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure
  • Feature liking
  • Fred Feldman's theory of happiness
  • Intrinsic attitudinal pleasure
  • John Pollock's theory of evaluative induction
  • State liking
  • The problem of double-counting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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