Abstract
Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-regarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 153-172 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Evolution and Human Behavior |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Altruism
- Evolution of cooperation
- Experimental games
- Reciprocity
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Animal Science and Zoology
- Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
- Development
Cite this
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. / Gintis, Herbert; Bowles, Samuel; Boyd, Robert; Fehr, Ernst.
In: Evolution and Human Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 3, 05.2003, p. 153-172.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
AU - Gintis, Herbert
AU - Bowles, Samuel
AU - Boyd, Robert
AU - Fehr, Ernst
PY - 2003/5
Y1 - 2003/5
N2 - Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-regarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods.
AB - Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-regarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods.
KW - Altruism
KW - Evolution of cooperation
KW - Experimental games
KW - Reciprocity
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038669290&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038669290&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5
DO - 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0038669290
VL - 24
SP - 153
EP - 172
JO - Evolution and Human Behavior
JF - Evolution and Human Behavior
SN - 1090-5138
IS - 3
ER -