Exit as Governance: An Empirical Analysis

Sreedhar Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman, Venky Nagar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

72 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recent theory posits a new governance channel available to blockholders: threat of exit. Threat of exit, as opposed to actual exit, is difficult to measure directly. However, a crucial property is that it is weaker when stock liquidity is lower and vice versa. We use natural experiments of financial crises and decimalization as exogenous shocks to stock liquidity. Firms with larger blockholdings experience greater declines (increases) in firm value during the crises (decimalization), particularly if the manager's wealth is sensitive to the stock price and thus to exit threats. Additional tests suggest exit threats are distinct from blockholder intervention.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2515-2547
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Finance
Volume68
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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