Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments

Cynthia E. Devers, Albert A. Cannella, Gregory P. Reilly, Michele E. Yoder

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

268 Scopus citations

Abstract

The failure to document a consistent and robust relationship between executive pay and firm performance has frustrated scholars and practitioners for over three quarters of a century. Although recent compensation research has revealed alternative theoretical frameworks and findings that hold the potential to significantly improve our understanding of executive compensation, to date this diverse literature lacks theoretical integration. Accordingly, we develop a framework to organize and review these recent findings. We further identify methodological issues and concerns, discuss the implications of these concerns, and provide recommendations for future research aimed at developing a more integrated research agenda.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1016-1072
Number of pages57
JournalJournal of Management
Volume33
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2007

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Keywords

  • Agency theory
  • Behavioral theory
  • Compensation design
  • Corporate governance
  • Executive compensation
  • Incentive pay
  • Risk

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007). Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of Management, 33(6), 1016-1072. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206307308588