Evolutionary games on the lattice: Best-response dynamics

Stephen Evilsizor, Nicolas Lanchier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which players are located on an infinite square lattice. In the presence of two strategies, and calling a strategy selfish or altruistic depending on a certain ordering of the coefficients of the underlying payoff matrix, a simple analysis of the nonspatial mean-field approximation of the spatial model shows that a strategy is evolutionary stable if and only if it is selfish, making the system bistable when both strategies are selfish. The spatial and nonspatial models agree when at least one strategy is altruistic. In contrast, we prove that in the presence of two selfish strategies and in any spatial dimension, only the most selfish strategy remains evolutionary stable. The main ingredients of the proof are monotonicity results and a coupling between the best-response dynamics properly rescaled in space with bootstrap percolation to compare the infinite time limits of both systems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number75
JournalElectronic Journal of Probability
Volume19
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 19 2014

Fingerprint

Evolutionary Game
Dynamic Response
Bootstrap Percolation
Evolutionary Strategy
Interacting Particle Systems
Bistable System
Mean-field Approximation
Spatial Model
Strategy
Best response dynamics
Evolutionary game
Square Lattice
Monotonicity
Update
Maximise
Game
If and only if
Coefficient

Keywords

  • Bootstrap percolation
  • Evolutionary stable strategy
  • Interacting particle systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

Evolutionary games on the lattice : Best-response dynamics. / Evilsizor, Stephen; Lanchier, Nicolas.

In: Electronic Journal of Probability, Vol. 19, 75, 19.08.2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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