Evolution of cooperation when feedback to reputation scores is voluntary

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

Reputation systems are used to facilitate interaction between strangers in one-shot social dilemmas, like transactions in e-commerce. The functioning of various reputation systems depend on voluntary feedback derived from the participants in those social dilemmas. In this paper a model is presented under which frequencies of providing feedback to positive and negative experiences in reputation systems explain observed levels of cooperation. The results from simulations show that it is not likely that reputation scores alone will lead to high levels of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)187-198
Number of pages12
JournalJASSS
Volume9
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 31 2006

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • One-Shot Prisoner Dilemma
  • Reputation
  • Symbols
  • Trust
  • Voluntary Feedback

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this