Abstract

Field experiments with asymmetric commons dilemmas have shown that groups who are able to derive high social efficiency also had higher equity compared to groups who were not able to derive significant levels of social efficiency. These findings resemble the high productivity in long-lasting irrigation systems based on self-governance. We present an agent-based model based on cultural group selection that shows that the patterns observed in the field experiments can be evolved in cases where agents participate regularly in less challenging symmetric public good dilemmas. These results indicate that cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas can evolve and persist when the agents contend with other social dilemmas than the asymmetric dilemmas.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)220-229
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume81
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2012

Fingerprint

Evolution of cooperation
Social efficiency
Field experiment
Group selection
Agent-based model
Social dilemma
Productivity
Equity
Irrigation
Self-governance

Keywords

  • Agent-based
  • Asymmetry
  • Common pool resources
  • Equity
  • Field experiments
  • Modeling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Evolution of cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas. / Janssen, Marcus; Rollins, Nathan D.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 81, No. 1, 01.2012, p. 220-229.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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