Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible

Marcus Janssen; Clint Bushman

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017

Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible

Marcus Janssen, Clint Bushman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

65 Scopus citations

Abstract

Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of the option of retaliation. We find that cooperation and altruistic punishment does not evolve with larger population levels if the option of retaliation is included.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	541-545
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume	254
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017
State	Published - Oct 7 2008

Keywords

Group selection
Public good games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Modeling and Simulation
General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
General Immunology and Microbiology
General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
Applied Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017

Cite this

@article{15f479020f3a448f9a5be513af4dc89b,

title = "Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible",

abstract = "Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of the option of retaliation. We find that cooperation and altruistic punishment does not evolve with larger population levels if the option of retaliation is included.",

keywords = "Group selection, Public good games",

author = "Marcus Janssen and Clint Bushman",

note = "Funding Information: We appreciate the support of the National Science Foundation for the Grant BCS-0432894.",

year = "2008",

month = oct,

day = "7",

doi = "10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "254",

pages = "541--545",

journal = "Journal of Theoretical Biology",

issn = "0022-5193",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible

AU - Janssen, Marcus

AU - Bushman, Clint

N1 - Funding Information: We appreciate the support of the National Science Foundation for the Grant BCS-0432894.

PY - 2008/10/7

Y1 - 2008/10/7

N2 - Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of the option of retaliation. We find that cooperation and altruistic punishment does not evolve with larger population levels if the option of retaliation is included.

AB - Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of the option of retaliation. We find that cooperation and altruistic punishment does not evolve with larger population levels if the option of retaliation is included.

KW - Group selection

KW - Public good games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=51349118084&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=51349118084&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017

DO - 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017

M3 - Article

C2 - 18638489

AN - SCOPUS:51349118084

SN - 0022-5193

VL - 254

SP - 541

EP - 545

JO - Journal of Theoretical Biology

JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology

IS - 3

ER -

Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this