Epistemic burdens and the incentives of surrogate decision-makers

Parker Crutchfield, Scott Scheall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We aim to establish the following claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue treatment options with respect to which their knowledge is most adequate to the requirements of the case. Regardless of what the patient would choose, options that require more knowledge than the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will either be neglected altogether or deeply discounted in the surrogate’s incentive structure. We establish this claim by arguing that the relation between epistemic burdens and incentives in decision-making is a general feature of surrogate decision-making. After establishing the claim, we draw out some of the implications for surrogate decision-making in medicine and offer philosophical and psychological explanations of the phenomenon.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)613-621
Number of pages9
JournalMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Volume22
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Motivation
decision maker
Decision Making
incentive
decision making
Medicine
medicine
Psychology
Weights and Measures
Therapeutics

Keywords

  • Epistemology
  • Ignorance
  • Surrogate decision-making

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health(social science)
  • Education
  • Health Policy

Cite this

Epistemic burdens and the incentives of surrogate decision-makers. / Crutchfield, Parker; Scheall, Scott.

In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 4, 01.12.2019, p. 613-621.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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